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This paper builds on and develops ideas presented in a keynote address delivered at the 
International Workshop on Regional Competitiveness and International Factor Movements, 





In his paper I study policy responses to an increase in post-merger distress. I consider the 
integration of regions as a merger of populations which I view as a revision of social space, 
and I identify the effect of the merger on aggregate distress. The paper is based on the premise 
that the merger of groups of people alters their social landscape and their comparators. 
Employing a specific measure of social distress that is based on the sensing of relative 
deprivation, a merger increases aggregate distress: the social distress of a merged population 
is greater than the sum of the social distress of the constituent populations when apart. In 
response, policies are enacted to ensure that aggregate distress and/or that of individuals does 
not rise after a merger. I consider two publicly-financed, cost-effective policies designed so as 
not to reduce individuals’ incomes: a policy that reverses the negative effect of the merger on 
the aggregate level of relative deprivation, bringing it back to the sum of the pre-merger levels 
of aggregate relative deprivation of the two populations when apart; and a policy that is aimed 
at retaining the relative deprivation of each individual at most at its pre-merger level. These 
two policies are developed as algorithms. Numerical examples illustrate the application of the 
algorithms. 
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I study policy responses to an increase in aggregate social distress brought about by the 
integration of regions, which I view as a merger of populations and the revision of social 
space and the comparison set. Specifically, I look at the merger of populations as a merger of 
income vectors; I measure social distress by aggregate relative deprivation; and I maintain 
that (except in the special case in which the merged populations have identical income 
distributions) a merger increases aggregate relative deprivation. Given this increase, I assess 
how a budget-constrained policy-maker can reverse the increase by means of least-cost post-
merger increases in individual incomes.  
When populations merge, the social environment and the social horizons faced by the 
individuals who constitute the merged population change: people who were previously 
outside the individuals’ social domain are brought in. Mergers of populations occur in many 
spheres of life, at different times and places. They arise as a result of administrative 
considerations or naturally, they are imposed or chosen. With the help of specific examples, 
Stark (2010), and Stark, Rendl, and Jakubek (2012) raise the possibility that the revision of 
social space associated with the integration of societies can chip away at the sense of 
wellbeing of the societies involved. If integration also brings in its wake social distress, then 
greater economic gain is required to make integration desirable.   
In Section 2 I present measures of individual and aggregate relative deprivation and I 
claim that the aggregate relative deprivation of merged populations is larger than or equal to 
the sum of the pre-merger levels of the aggregate relative deprivation of the constituent 
populations (a superadditivity result). In Section 3 I study policy responses to the increase in 
post-merger discontent. Section 4 provides discussion and conclusions.  
 
2. A measure of deprivation and the superadditivity of aggregate relative deprivation 
(ARD) with respect to the merger of two populations 
I measure the distress of a population by the sum of the levels of distress experienced by the 
individuals who constitute the population. I refer to this sum as the aggregate relative 
deprivation (ARD) of the population. I measure the distress of an individual by the extra 
income units that others in the population have, I sum up these excesses, and I normalize by 
the size of the population. This approach tracks the seminal work of Runciman (1966) and its 
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articulation by Yitzhaki (1979), and Hey and Lambert (1980); a detailed description is in 
Stark and Hyll (2011). In my definition of relative deprivation I resort to income-based 
comparisons, namely, an individual feels relatively deprived when others in his comparison 
group earn more than him. To concentrate on essentials, I assume that the comparison group 
of each individual consists of all members of his population.  
Formally, for an ordered vector of incomes in population P of size n , ( )1,..., nx x x= , 
where 1 2 ... nxx x≤ ≤ ≤ , I define the relative deprivation of the i-th individual whose income is 
i
x , 1,2,...,i n= , as 






RD x x x x
n =
≡ −∑ . (1) 
To ease the analysis that follows, an alternative representation of the relative deprivation 
measure is helpful. 
Lemma 1. Let ( )iF x  be the fraction of those in the population P whose incomes are smaller 
than or equal to 
i
x . The relative deprivation of an individual earning 
i
x  in population P with 
an income vector ( )1,..., nx x x=  is equal to the fraction of those whose incomes are higher 
than 
i
x  times their mean excess income, namely,  
 ( ) [ ] ( ), 1 ( ) |i i i iRD x x F x E x x x x= − ⋅ − > . (2) 
Proof. I multiply 
1
n
 in (1) by the number of the individuals who earn more than 
i









−∑  in (1) by this same number. I then obtain two ratios: the first is the fraction 
of the population who earn more than the individual, namely [ ]1 ( )iF x− ; the second is mean 
excess income, namely ( )|i iE x x x x− > . □ 


























∑ . (3) 
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( )ARD x  is my index of the level of “distress” of population P. (For several usages of this 
measure in recent related work see Stark, 2010; Fan and Stark, 2011; Stark and Fan, 2011; 
Stark and Hyll, 2011; Stark, Hyll, and Wang, 2012; Stark, Rendl, and Jakubek, 2012.)   
I now consider two populations, 1P  and 2P , with ordered income vectors ( )1 1ix x=  and 
( )22 ix x=  of dimensions 1n  and 2n , respectively. Total population size is 1 2n n n= + . The 
ordered income vector of the merged population is denoted 1 2x xo , and is the n-dimensional 
income vector obtained by merging the two income vectors and ordering the resulting n 
components from lowest to highest.
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In the following claim I state that the difference ( ) ( ) ( )21 2 1ARD x x ARD x ARD x− −o  
is in fact non-negative: a merger increases aggregate relative deprivation or leaves it 
unchanged. Namely, if I conceptualize the merger of two income vectors as an addition 
operator, then ARD is a superadditive function of the income vectors. (A function H is 
superadditive if for all x, y it satisfies ( ) ( ) ( ) 0H x y H x H y− − ≥+ .) 
Claim 1. Let 1P  and 2P  be two populations with ordered income vectors 
1
x  and 2x , and let 
1 2
x xo  be the ordered vector of merged incomes. Then  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 0ARD x x ARD x ARD x− − ≥o . 
Proof. A proof for the case of the merger of populations with two incomes each is in Stark 
(2010); proof for the case of the merger of any two populations is in Stark (2012).   
Example 1: consider the merger of populations 1P  and 2P  with income vectors 
1 (1,2)x =  and 2 (3,4)x = , respectively. The pre-merger levels of aggregate relative 
deprivation are ( )1 1/ 2ARD x =  and ( )2 1/ 2ARD x = . In the merged population with income 
vector 1 2 (1,2,3 4, )x x =o , I have that ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 25 / 2 1ARD x x ARD x ARD x= > = +o . This 
example vividly illustrates further why a formal proof of the superadditivity result is needed. 
Even in the simple case in which the two populations do not overlap and a relatively poor, 
two-person population 1 (1,2)x =  merges with a relatively rich, two-person population 
2 (3,4)x = , the overall relative deprivation effect cannot be pre-ascertained. In such a case, it 
is quite clear that upon integration members of the poorer population are subjected to more 
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relative deprivation, whereas members of the richer population other than the richest are 
subjected to less relative deprivation. Because one constituent population experiences an 
increase of its ARD while another experiences a decrease, whether the ARD of the merged 
population is higher than the sum of the ARDs of the constituent populations cannot be 
determined without formal analysis. Put differently, in a setting in which others could only 
bring negative externalities, a smaller population will always experience less aggregate 
relative deprivation. But in a setting such as mine when others joining in can confer both 
negative externalities (of 3 and 4 upon 1 and 2) and positive externalities (of 1 and 2 upon 3), 
it is impossible to determine without proof whether the expansion of a population will entail a 
reduction in aggregate relative deprivation or an increase.
2
   
 Because throughout I have kept incomes unchanged, the incomes of the members of a 
constituent population are not affected by its merger with another population: in my setting, a 
merger changes the social comparisons space that governs the sensing and calculation of 
relative income (relative deprivation), but it leaves absolute incomes intact. If I assume that 
individuals’ wellbeing depend positively on absolute income and negatively on the 
experienced relative deprivation, a merger leads to a deterioration of the aggregate wellbeing 
of at least one of the merged populations. 
I next ask how a government that is concerned about the increase of the aggregate 
level of social distress will be able to respond in a cost effective manner. Governments must 
be well aware that an increase in social distress could translate into social unrest, and there 
have been plenty of episodes, historical and current, to remind governments of the short 
distance between social distress and social protest.  
 
3. Policy responses to the post-merger increase in ARD 
The unwarranted repercussions of a merger on the wellbeing of populations and individuals 
invite design and assessment of policies aimed at counteracting the increase in ARD or in 
individuals’ RD. 
                                                 
2
 To see the variation in the externality repercussion even more starkly, note that when 3 joins 1 and 1, he 
confers a negative externality on the incumbents; when 3 joins 5 and 5 he confers neither a negative externality 




I study publicly-financed, cost-effective policies that are constrained not to reduce 
individuals’ incomes. I consider two targets of governmental policy aimed at reversing the 
deleterious effect of merger:  
Bringing down the aggregate level of relative deprivation to a level equal to the sum of the 
pre-merger levels of the aggregate relative deprivation in the two populations when apart; I 
refer to this problem as 1Π .  
Seeing to it that no individual in the integrated population senses higher relative deprivation 
than the relative deprivation he sensed prior to the merger; I refer to this problem as 2Π . 
Naturally, the government is keen to minimize the cost of implementing its chosen 
policy, which it enacts subject to the condition that in the process, no income is allowed to 
decrease.
3
 Under the first policy, individual levels of relative deprivation may increase, 
decrease, or remain unchanged. Under the second policy, individual relative deprivations 
cannot increase. This added constraint implies that the budgetary allocation needed to solve 
the second problem will be larger than the corresponding one needed to solve the first 
problem. 
The cost of the solutions to these two problems can be interpreted as lower bounds on 
the additional income that the process of economic (income) growth has to yield in order to 
retain the aggregate relative deprivation or the individual levels of relative deprivation at their 
pre-merger levels. 
 
3.1 Solving problem 1Π  
Clearly, the basic requirement of problem 1Π  can be satisfied by a trivial solution: lifting the 
incomes of all the individuals to the highest level of income in the merged population. In 
general, such a solution will not, however, be optimal.
4
 It will be possible to achieve 
                                                 
3
 I resort here to this last condition because of an implicit assumption that an individual’s utility depends 
positively on his income and negatively on his relative deprivation. Because I do not know the exact rate of 
substitution between decrease in relative deprivation and decrease in income, I do not know how much income I 
could take away from an individual whose relative deprivation decreased in the wake of the merger. Therefore, 
to guarantee that the utility of an individual will not be decreased in the process, I impose the requirement that 
incomes cannot be lowered. Put differently, seeing to it that the individual’s post-merger relative deprivation is 
not higher than his pre-merger relative deprivation while holding the individual’s income constant constitutes a 
sufficient condition for retaining the individual’s wellbeing at its pre-merger level. 
4
 There are, however, specific cases where this solution is optimal such as when, for example, the merged 
populations consists each of one individual, with one individual earning less than the other. 
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optimality by choosing carefully a subset of individuals for whom the marginal increase in 
incomes yields the highest marginal decrease in aggregate relative deprivation.  
 Let ( )1 2 1,..., nx x x x=o  be the ordered vector of incomes in the merged population. 
Consider the subset in the merged population of the individuals who earn the lowest income; I 
denote this subset by Ω . I now analyze what happens when marginally and by the same 
amount I increase the incomes of the individuals in Ω , where marginal increase refers to such 
an increase that the incomes of these individuals will not become higher than the income of 
any individual outside the set Ω . 
First, suppose that the set Ω  consists of just one individual out of the n members of 
the merged population, and that the government appropriates a sum ε  to increase his income, 
where ε  is small enough to satisfy my definition of a marginal increase in income. Using (2), 





 because the mean excess income of 




 individuals earning more than him is reduced by the amount ε . At the 
same time, as this individual’s income was, and continues to be, the lowest in the population, 
this disbursement does not increase the relative deprivation of any other individual and 







−∆ = . (4) 
I next show that (4) is the highest marginal decrease in ARD achievable upon spending 
ε  on a single individual. I do this by contradiction. Suppose that I were to increase by ε  not 
the income of the lowest-earning individual but the income of an individual earning 1ix x> . 
Then, the relative deprivation of this i individual will decrease as a result of his income 
getting closer to the incomes of the individuals earning more than him, but the relative 





is the number of individuals earning strictly more (less) than 
i
x , the marginal change in 
aggregate relative deprivation will be  
 i i i i










because the mean excess income of the fraction of i
n
n
 individuals earning more than 
i
x  falls 
by the amount ε , yet at the same time, the relative deprivation of each of the 
i
n%  individuals 
earning less than 
i





n ≥%  and 
i
n n< , comparing (4) and (5) yields 
 







Thus, channeling the transfer to an individual who is not the lowest income recipient in the 
population yields a lower decrease in aggregate relative deprivation than increasing the 
income of the individual who earns the lowest income. 
 Second, I allow the set Ω  to expand to include more than one individual. I denote by 
Ω  the size of the set Ω . Suppose again that the government appropriates the sum ε  to 
increase the earnings of each member of the subset Ω  by 
ε
Ω
. The fraction of the individuals 




, and the mean excess 
income of these individuals falls by 
ε
Ω
. Therefore, each of the members of Ω  will 





. Again, because no 
individual experiences an increase in his relative deprivation, this disbursement yields a 












∆ = .  
As in the case of the set Ω  consisting of a single individual, this is obviously the optimal use 
of ε  for any subset of the merged population. 
 Drawing on the preceding protocol, I present the optimal solution to problem (policy 
response) 1Π  in the form of an algorithm as follows.  
Algorithm 1A : 




2. Proceed to increase simultaneously the incomes of the members of the set Ω , until 
either 
a. the aggregate relative deprivation is brought down to the pre-merger level 
or 
b. the incomes of the members of the set Ω  reach the income of the first 
individual(s) who is (are) not a member (members) of this set, in which case 
start from step 1 once again. 
It is easy to ascertain the optimality of Algorithm 1A : at each step, I increase the 
incomes of those individuals who earn the lowest, therefore the decrease in aggregate relative 
deprivation is the most effective, and the relative deprivation of no individual increases in the 
process. Heuristically, I start “pumping” incomes from the bottom, and I simultaneously 
gauge the aggregate relative deprivation response. The two processes move in tandem, and in 
opposite directions. The pumping from below is ratcheted up the hierarchy of the individuals, 
and it ceases when aggregate relative deprivation reaches the level at which it was prior to the 
merger.  
 Example 2: consider the merger of populations 1P  and 2P  with income vectors 
1 (1,2)x =  and 2 (3,4)x = , respectively. The pre-merger levels of aggregate relative 
deprivation are ( )1 1/ 2ARD x =  and ( )2 1/ 2ARD x = . Because in the merged population with 
income vector 1 2 (1,2 3, , 4)x x z= ≡o  I have that ( )1 2 5 / 2ARD x x =o  
( ) ( )1 21 ARD x ARD x> = + , the government seeks to lower the aggregate relative deprivation 
of the merged population back to 1/2 + 1/2 = 1. Applying Algorithm 1A , I first include in the 
set Ω  the individual earning 1, and I increase his income. Upon his income reaching the 
income of the next individual who earns 2, I obtain the income vector 1 (2,2 4),3,z = , with 
( )1 7 / 4ARD z = . Thus, giving the individual earning 1 an additional unit of income is 
insufficient to bring down aggregate relative deprivation to its pre-merger level. I therefore 
add the next individual (the individual whose pre-merger income was 2) to the set Ω , and I 
proceed to further increase the incomes of each of the two individuals who now constitute the 
set Ω  and whose incomes are, for now, 2 each. At the point where these two incomes are 
elevated to 11/ 4  each, I obtain 2 (11/ 4,1 ,1/ 4 3 4),z =  with ( )2 1ARD z = . Thus, in order to 
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bring the aggregate relative deprivation in the merged population to the sum of the pre-merger 
level, I have to transfer 7 / 4  units of income to the individual earning 1, and 3 / 4  units of 
income to the individual earning 2, which gives 10 / 4  as the total cost of implementing the 
policy.  
 
3.2 Solving problem 2Π  
In order to solve problem 2Π , I first present a simple link between the levels of relative 
deprivation and the levels of income in a population. 
Lemma 2. If an individual has the i-th highest income in a population, he has the i-th lowest 
level of relative deprivation in the population.
5
 
Proof. It is easy to see that individuals earning the highest level of income have zero relative 
deprivation, which is the lowest possible level, whereas the order of the other individuals in 
the relative deprivation hierarchy is obtained from the two relationships 
 ( ) ( ), ,  for k kj jRD x x RD x x x x> <  
and 
 ( ) ( ), ,  for k kj jRD x x RD x x x x= = . □ 
 Lemma 2 tells me that the relative deprivation of an individual is inexorably related to 
his rank in the income hierarchy. The procedure of solving problem 2Π  builds on the simple 
fact that the hierarchy of the levels of relative deprivation mimics in reverse the hierarchy of 
incomes. 
The following algorithm solves problem 2Π . 
Algorithm 2A : 
1. Starting with the post-merger income vector 1 2x xo , I construct a vector w  by 
arranging the elements of the 1 2x xo  vector in descending order with respect to the 
pre-merger levels of relative deprivation. (If two or more individuals have the same 
                                                 
5
 By i-th highest I mean an ordering that allows for (co-)sharing a position, that is, in a population with incomes 
(1, 2, 2,3) , the individual earning 3 has the 1st highest income, the individuals earning 2 have the 2nd highest 
incomes, and the individual earning 1 has the 3rd highest income. 
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pre-merger level of relative deprivation, I place leftmost the one with the lower 
income.) 
2. I pick the individuals one at a time according to their placement in the w vector 
starting from the rightmost end and proceeding leftwards. If an individual has higher 
relative deprivation than prior to the merger, I increase his income to the minimal level 
that brings down his relative deprivation to the pre-merger level. If the relative 
deprivation of an individual is the same as or is lower than prior to the merger, I do not 
raise his income.  
To establish the rationale and optimality of Algorithm 2A , I implement 1 above by 
numbering the elements in the w vector in a descending order, namely as ( )2 1,..., , ,nw w w w=  
such that the leftmost individual earning 
n
w  is the individual who had the highest pre-merger 
level of relative deprivation, and the rightmost individual earning 1w  is the individual whose 
pre-merger level of relative deprivation was the lowest. 
The optimality of Algorithm 2A  hinges on the property that an individual’s relative 
deprivation never increases as a result of changes made after his “turn” has come, given that I 
am proceeding leftwards in the w vector. To see this, I denote the vector of incomes after i 
steps, 1 i n≤ < , with i incomes 1,...,iw w′ ′  being dealt with, as ( )1 1,..., , ,...,n i
i
iw w w w w+ ′ ′= . 
When I proceed then to the next income 1iw + , one of two possibilities arises. 
First, the current relative deprivation of the individual with income 1iw + , 
( )1, iiRD w w+ , can be lower or equal to the relative deprivation that he had prior to the merger; 
in such a circumstance, I do not increase his income. Therefore, the relative deprivations of 
other individuals, in particular those with incomes to the right of this individual, 1,...,iw w′ ′ , do 
not increase. The second possibility is that the current relative deprivation of the individual 
with income 1iw + , ( )1, iiRD w w+ , is higher than his pre-merger relative deprivation. In such a 
circumstance, I increase his income to the level 1iw +′ , which is the minimal income that 
equalizes the pre-merger relative deprivation and ( )1,i iRD w w+′ . I note that this change in 
income cannot affect the relative deprivation of those having incomes 1,...,iw w′ ′  because, 
according to Lemma 2, 1 jiw w+′ ′≤  for 1,...,j i= . It is a trivial feature of the relative deprivation 
11 
 
index that the relative deprivation of an individual earning v  does not increase when incomes 
that are lower than v  are raised, as long as the raised incomes do not surpass v . 
The preceding reasoning leads me to conclude that for 1,...,i n= , the 
i
w′  income is the 
lowest possible level of income which guarantees, first, that the relative deprivation of an 
individual will be no higher than prior to the merger and, second, that this individual’s relative 
deprivation will not be affected by the process of adjusting the incomes of individuals to his 
left in the w vector whose incomes are 1,...,n iw w + . This protocol delivers the optimality of 
Algorithm 2A .  
Heuristically, in order to address problem 2Π  I first raise the incomes at the top of the 
constructed hierarchy of the levels of relative deprivation; I do so in order to equate the levels 
of relative deprivations of the top-income individuals with the pre-merger levels of relative 
deprivation. Then, because the comparisons that yield relative deprivation are with incomes 
on the right in the income hierarchy, the changes made at the top determine by how much 
incomes that are further down the hierarchy have to be raised as I move leftwards.  
Example 3: consider the merger of populations 1P  and 2P  with income vectors 
1 (1,2)x =  and 2 (3,4)x = , respectively. The pre-merger levels of relative deprivation are 
( )11, 1/ 2RD x = , ( )12, 0RD x = , ( )23, 1/ 2RD x = , and ( )24, 0RD x = . Therefore, in the 
merged population with income vector 1 2 (1,2,3 4, )x x =o , I have that the vector w, ordered 
according to the descending pre-merger levels of relative deprivation (with the lower of two 
incomes associated with the same level of relative deprivation placed leftmost) is 
( )3 124 , , , (1,3, 2, 4)w w w w w= = . I pick first “for treatment” the individual with income 1 4w = . 
Noting that his relative deprivation was not increased as a result of the merger, 1 4w′ =  and 
thus, 1 (1,3,2,4)w = . Moving leftwards, I next attend to the individual with income 2 2w = . 
Because ( ) ( )1 12, 3 / 4 0 2,RD w RD x= > = , I need to raise income 2w  to the level 2 4w′ = , 
because then ( ) ( )1 14, 0 2,RD w RD x= = . Consequently, I obtain 2 (1,3,4,4)w = . Proceeding 
further leftwards to 3 3w = , I have that ( ) ( )2 23, 1/ 2 3,RD w RD x= = , and so no increase in 
income is needed in this case. Thus, I obtain 3 (1,3, 4, 4)w = . Because for the remaining 
individual with income 4 1w =  I have that ( ) ( )3 11, 2 1/ 2 1,RD w RD x= > = , I need to increase 
12 
 
his income to 4 3w′ =  as then, ( ) ( )3 13, 1/ 2 1,RD w RD x= = . Thus, the final income vector is 
4 (3,3,4,4)w = , which gives 4 as the total cost of implementing the policy.  
Pulling together the results of Example 2 and Example 3, I have:  
Example 2: Income vector 2 (2.75, 2 ,.75 3 4),z = , cost of implementation 2.5; 
Example 3: Income vector 4 (3,3,4,4)w = , cost of implementation 4. 
Not surprisingly, because the constraint on implementing policy 2Π  is stricter than the 
constraint on implementing policy 1Π , enacting policy 2Π  is costlier. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
Processes and policies that integrate economic entities also revise the social landscape of the 
people who populate the entities. I have considered the case in which the form that the 
revision takes is an expansion - be it the result of closer proximity to others, more intensive 
social interactions, or reduced barriers to the flow of information. I have argued that a 
consequence of the changing social milieu is the casting of a shadow on the anticipated 
economic gains.  
An increase in aggregate relative deprivation is a down side to the integration of 
regions. It puts a strain on the individuals in the merged population, casting a shadow over the 
production and trade (scale and scope) benefits anticipated from integration. An increase in 
relative deprivation can itself cause an adverse physiological reaction such as psychosomatic 
stress, and could lead to social unrest and a collective response in the form of public protest. 
To aid a social planner who seeks cost-effectively to counter this negative effect, I analyzed 
policy measures in a setting in which incomes are not allowed to fall. In this setting, the 
policy measure to be adopted depends on whether the policy objective is to bring the 
aggregate level of relative deprivation down to the sum of the pre-merger levels, or to ensure 
that no individual experiences more relative deprivation than prior to the merger. I formulated 
algorithms to guide the implementation of these policy measures, and in illustrative examples 
I calculated the associated cost that the social planner would need to bear.  
However, my analysis did not take into account all the possible effects of a merger. As 
already mentioned, the integration of regions and economies is expected to increase 
efficiency. When the possibility of a merger is contemplated, an interesting question to 
13 
 
address would be whether the anticipated boost in productivity will suffice to pay for the cost 
of the policies discussed above.  
My analysis is essentially of the “comparative statics” type, with the revision of the 
social landscape occurring at the time of the merger, and the expected increase in incomes in 
the wake of the merger yet to come. Introducing dynamics need not erode my main argument, 
however. The revision of the comparison group could be gradual and coincide with the 
processes of scale economies and scope economies taking hold. Still, as long as the latter 
processes do not result in sufficient convergence of incomes, the former process could still 
damage the post-merger sense of wellbeing. (“Sufficiency” stands for, say in the case of 
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